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Abstract: One of the controversial issues in the development of Heidegger’s 
thought is the problem of the will. Th e communis opinio is that Heidegger 
embraced the concept of the will in a non-critical manner at the beginning 
of the thirties and , in particular, he employed it in his political speeches of 
1933–1934. Jacques Derrida for instance speaks about a “massive voluntarism” 
in relation to Heidegger’s thought in this period. Also Brett Davis discerns 
a period of “existential voluntarism” in 1930–1934, in which Heidegger 
takes over a notion of the will in a non-critical manner. In this article, this 
interpretation is challenged and a stronger interpretation of Heidegger’s 
concern with the will is developed. Our hypothesis is that Heidegger’s concern 
with the will at the onset of the thirties is brought about by his confrontation 
(Auseinandersetzung) with the concept of the will. Based on his lecture courses 
from 1930 and 1936/37 and his Rectoral Address from 1933, enables us to 
discern three main characteristics of Heidegger’s destructed concept of the will 
in the early thirties. 
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Introduction
One of the controversial issues in the development of Heidegger’s thought 
is the problem of the will. Already in Being and Time of 1927, the role of the 
will is quite ambiguous. Although he is silent on the question about the will 
in Being and Time—he only assures us that the will has no ontological signifi -
cance at all—concepts like the resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) of human being 
can be seen as a resolute will. While the concept of the will played an implicit 
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and ambiguous role around the time he wrote Being and Time, in the early 
thirties Heidegger explicitly confronted this concept.1 
Th e communis opinio is that Heidegger embraced the concept of the will in 
a non-critical manner at the beginning of the thirties, and employed it as such 
in his political speeches of 1933–1934. Jacques Derrida for instance speaks of 
a “massive voluntarism” in Heidegger’s thought in this period (Derrida 1989: 
46). More recently, Bret Davis wrote a monumental study on Heidegger’s 
treatment of the problem of the will. He distinguishes between a period of 
political and existential voluntarism in which Heidegger took over a concept 
of the will in a non-critical way—this constituting “the absolute zero point in 
Heidegger’s (lack of ) thought with regard to the problem of the will”—fol-
lowed by a stage in which he attempted to conceive of a proper sense of the 
will—will as reservedness (Verhaltenheit)—a stage which was fi nally followed 
by a period in which he dropped the concept of the will completely.2 Around 
1938–39, he realized that the concept of the will is anchored in the human 
being of a subject that is willing. In his later thought, one of the main issues 
is the releasement from the wilful way of thinking and the exploration of the 
possibility of a gelassen or non-willing way of philosophical thinking. 
In this article, we challenge this interpretation of Heidegger’s treatment of 
the problem of the will and develop a stronger one. My hypothesis is that Heidegger’s 
concern for the will at the onset of the thirties does not testify to a “massive 
voluntarism” or “existential voluntarism”, as Derrida and Davis have suggested, 
but is rather due to his confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) with, and destruction 
of, the concept of the will. In this article we shall inquire into the development 
of Heidegger’s confrontation with the will in the thirties. 
In section 1 we start with Heidegger’s lecture course in 1930, in which he 
challanged the “pure will” of Kant’s practical philosophy. In the early 1930s, 
Heidegger destructed the concept of the will and developed his own proper 
concept of willing in confrontation with Kant. We will discern three main 
characteristics of Heidegger’s concept of the will. Th ese three characteristics 
will be subsequently traced in his critical engagement with the will in the mid-
thirties (1936/37) (§2). Th e elaboration of Heidegger’s destructed concept of 
the will in §1 and §2, enables us to understand what Heidegger had in mind 
with his destructed concept of willing in the thirties. In section 3, we fi nally 
test our hypothesis by tracing Heidegger’s concept of the will in his Rectoral 
Address (1933), and draw some conclusions.
1 For the ambiguous role of the will in Sein und Zeit, see Davis 2007: 73. 
2 Davis 2007: 73. In his study of the twists and turns in Heidegger’s thought with regard to 
the problem of the will, Davis does not take into account the possibility that Heidegger’s pro-
found Auseinandersetzung with the concept of the will is phenomenologically motivated. In this 
article, we focus exactly on this aspect of Heidegger’s confrontation with the issue of will.
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 1. Heidegger’s confrontation with the issue of the will in his Auseinander-
setzung with Kant (1930)3
Prior to his Rectoral Address of 1933, Heidegger held a lecture-course in 1930 
on the essence of human freedom. In the fi nal part of this course, Heidegger dis-
cusses Kant’s conception of the “pure will”. In the Critique of Practical Reason of 
1788, Kant showed that the pure will provides the basis for practical freedom by 
revealing universal laws (the categorical imperative). 
In his study on Heidegger and the Will, Brett Davis argues that Heidegger 
“is more interested in the autonomy and the purity of the will” in this lecture 
course on Kant, “than he is with its disclosure of universal rational laws” (Da-
vis 2007: 67); whilst for Kant the pure will and the law of practical reason 
cannot be separated, for Heidegger, the pure will unilaterally determines the 
law of practical reason. To support his claim, Davis refers to Heidegger’s lec-
ture course from 1930: “What is genuinely law-giving for willing is the actual 
pure willing itself and nothing else” (GA 31: 279). For Davis, the primacy of 
“actual pure willing” is an indication of Heidegger’s existential voluntarism, 
which is defi ned as the “resolute will to take on the burden of imposing mean-
ing on an otherwise meaningless world” (Davis 2007: 42). 
But the question is whether the primacy of “actual pure willing” is indeed 
an indication of Heidegger’s existential voluntarism or is rather due to his way 
of philosophical methodology in the thirties. In this section, we will argue for 
the latter possibility and reject Davis’ thesis. Furthermore, by discussing Hei-
degger’s confrontation with the concept of the will, we are able to distinguish 
three main characteristics of Heidegger’s destructed concept of the will. 
In the thirties, Heidegger characterized his own philosophical method as a 
confrontation (Auseinandersetzung). In his lecture course of 1930 for instance, 
he claims with regard to Kant that he did 
not problematize in a suffi  cient primordial manner the fi nitude of man. […] 
To show this is the task of a Kant interpretation, which, however, does not 
have the pseudo-philological aim of presenting the “correct” Kant—there is 
nothing of the sort. […] as long as we do not resolutely enter into the occur-
rence of philosophy by means of a philosophizing confrontation, everything 
remains closed to us. […] To be sure, confrontation does not mean what the 
common understanding assumes, i.e. criticizing and contradicting. Instead, it 
is a bringing back of the other, and thereby also of oneself, to what is primary 
and originary, to that which, as the essential, is itself the common, and thus 
3 Parts of this and the next section were published earlier as Blok 2013. While that paper is 
concerned with a systematic and critical refl ection on Heidegger’s phenomenology of the will, 
and off ers our own thoughts on how to build on Heidegger´s phenomenology of willing, this 
paper purely focuses on the historical development of Heidegger´s phenomenology of the will 
in the thirties. 
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not needful of any subsequent alliance. Philosophical controversy is interpreta-
tion as destruction. (GA 31: 168; cf. 292)
In another article, I elaborated three main characteristics of Heidegger’s 
method of confrontation in the thirties, which can be identifi ed in the quote 
above.4 First of all, the method of confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) makes 
an eff ort to halt at the other or the diff erence (auseinander) without reconcil-
ing this diff erence, for instance, between Kant’s and Heidegger’s concepts of 
the fi nitude of man. Th e second characteristic of confrontation is that we are 
involved (einbegriff en) in the confrontation; it concerns the fi nitude of man 
and my fi nitude at the same time. Th e third characteristic of confrontation 
is its momentous character; it involves a resolute occurrence of philosophy, 
which the thinker has to enact every time again by everyone for himself or 
herself. It is this kind of interpretation as destruction which takes place in 
Heidegger’s confrontation with the concept of the will in the thirties. We will 
follow for a moment Heidegger’s confrontation with the concept of the will 
in his lecture course of 1930.
According to Kant, the will is “a faculty …, either of bringing forth 
objects corresponding to representations, or of determining itself, i.e. its 
causality to eff ect such objects” (CPR: 128). Kant’s distinction between two 
capacities of the will is rooted in the philosophical tradition. Plato can be 
seen as the founder of the concept of the striving will (boulèsthai), which 
brings forth objects that correspond to (rational) representations (Gorg: 
455d6–e2). In addition to this fi rst capacity of the will, Aristotle discerns 
the freedom of the will. According to Aristotle, a human being is the princi-
ple, master or cause of his own actions. Th is distinguishes man from animals 
and plants (EE: 1222b17; 1224a28–30). 
In his confrontation with Kant’s concept of the freedom of the will, Hei-
degger asks what causes freedom, when it has no external cause. “Now if will 
can determine its own causation, it has the possibility of determining itself in 
its causation through itself. ... In this case willing takes its determining ground 
not from somewhere else but from itself. And what does willing take from itself? 
It takes itself, in its essence“ (GA 31: 276–277). Although it is not directly clear 
why willing takes its determining ground from itself, and not, for instance, from 
the world, in this section, as we said, we follow Heidegger’s line of reasoning 
in his confrontation with the will. For Heidegger there is no external cause of 
willing, which means that the cause of willing is the actual willing itself: “Pure 
willing is the willing of one’s own essence as will” (GA 31: 278). 
Th is primacy of actual willing doesn’t indicate an existential voluntarism, as 
Davis suggests. On the contrary, Heidegger asks what kind of will it is which 
purely wills itself. Following Kant, Heidegger argues that such a will uncon-
ditionally determines its own willing. “It cannot help but be in harmony with 
4 Blok 2009: 43–57. See there for an extended elaboration of the method of confrontation. 
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itself, its pure essence, i.e. it cannot but be good. And a will that cannot but be 
good is a perfectly good will, or as Kant says, a holy, divine will” (GA 31: 280). So 
if any, only a divine will can be seen as “existential voluntaristic”. But in case 
of fi nite beings like humans, the will is not in harmony with itself because it is 
determined by other motives too, and by its sensibility. So for Heidegger the 
question remains what causes the pure willing of fi nite beings like humans, 
when it has no external cause?
Following Kant in his Critique of Practical Reason, Heidegger argues that 
the causality of something has to be understood as the law of the existence of 
something; it is the law according to which something comes into existence.5 
From this Heidegger concludes that the cause of fi nite pure willing is the law for 
the existence of the will. And, according to Heidegger, this law is the actual pure 
willing itself (GA 31: 278). So unlike the existential voluntarism of divine willing, 
fi nite pure willing is found in “the ought of pure willing” (GA 31: 280); the law-
giving of fi nite pure willing has the character of an imperative, i.e. of a “you oath”.
And now we reach the point where Heidegger’s destruction of Kant’s con-
cept of the will commences. According to Heidegger, “the decisive point for 
the understanding of the whole problem” (GA 31: 285) resides in the question 
about the actuality of the law of fi nite pure willing. Kant didn’t ask this question: 
However, Kant remains a long way from explicitly making this factuality as 
such into a central metaphysical problem, i.e. from bringing its conceptual 
articulation over into the essence of man and thus arriving at the threshold of 
a fundamentally diff erent problematic (GA 31: 294). 
According to Kant we become conscious of the categorial imperative “as soon 
as we construct maxims for the will” (CPR: 53): “Th is principle needs no 
search and no invention, having long been in the reason of all men and em-
bodied in their being. It is the principle of ethics” (CPR: 59). 
To Heidegger these statements sound quite peculiar. Is the law of fi nite 
pure willing undeniably and immediately evident to the most common rea-
son? Is it a fact embodied in the essence of man? Is it always present and 
can we confi rm it at any time, as if with our nose and ears? Heidegger does 
not agree with Kant’s understanding of the actuality of the law of fi nite pure 
willing as an object present-at-hand (vorhanden). “It could also be conceded 
that this fact represents a specifi c kind of factuality quite diff erent from that 
pertaining to present things…” (GA 31: 291). And this rejection of the self-
evidence of the law of fi nite pure willing is phenomenologically motivated. If 
we observe ourselves in a completely unprejudiced way, we do not discover 
this law as a present-at-hand object within ourselves. 
5 In this article, we focus on Heidegger’s confrontation with the will. Th erefore, we do not 
ask whether Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant is correct or not. For this, see the study of Davis 
2007: 65–71. 
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For Heidegger, therefore, the question remains what is the ontological sta-
tus of the actuality of the law of fi nite pure willing. To answer this question, 
once again Heidegger takes up a notion of Kant: as for Kant we become con-
scious of the law “as soon as we construct (entwerfen) maxims of the will” (em-
phasis added). Th is condition of the possibility of experiencing the factuality 
of the law means, that we betake ourselves into the specifi c realm of such facts, 
i.e. that we actually will. Th e law of fi nite pure willing is solely in willing it.
According to Heidegger, this actuality of the law of fi nite pure willing 
is actual in a twofold sense. Firstly, the actuality of the law only gives itself 
through and in our willing it. Secondly, it is only this actuality of the law that 
is proper to our will as will. Th e law of fi nite pure willing is in fact only be-
cause and insofar the will wills it, and the will is only in the ought demanded 
by pure willing, i.e. the law of fi nite pure willing. Pure will and the law of 
fi nite pure willing are therefore interconnected and interdependent. 
Before we elaborate on this interdependency and interconnectedness of 
pure will and the law of fi nite pure willing (cf. §2), we come back here to 
Davis’ (and Derrida’s) claim that Heidegger’s embrace of actual pure willing 
in the early thirties is an indication of his massive or existential voluntarism. 
When Heidegger rejects the evidence of Kant’s law of fi nite pure willing, this 
doesn’t imply he distinguishes between fi nite pure willing on the one hand and 
its rational law of willing on the other, that he thereupon rejects the primacy of 
the rational law and instead claims that the pure will “unilaterally determines 
the law of practical reason”, as Davis suggests (Davis 2007: 68). First of all, 
when fi nite pure willing and its law are interconnected—and this is the case 
according to Heidegger—they cannot be separated. Moreover, when they are 
interdependent, neither does the will conform unilaterally to the law nor is 
the law forced unilaterally to conform to the will. In other words, when fi nite 
pure willing and its law are interconnected and interdependent, there is no 
starting point for any voluntarism or determinism of the will. 
Th e concept of the will is rather destructed in order to remind us of three 
main characteristics of the will: 1) the self-orientation of willing consists in the 
fact that the cause of willing is the actual willing itself. Th is characteristic is 
indeed acknowledged by Davis (Davis 2007: 67), but cannot be interpreted as 
existential voluntarism because of the other two characteristics of the will: 2) In 
actual willing, the one who wills and that which is willed are interdependent and 
interconnected. 3) Th is interdependency of the one who wills and that which 
is willed has the character of law-giving, i.e. of a “you ought”. When Heidegger 
uses the concept of the will in the beginning of the thirties, it is characterized by 
these three elements and only used in this destructed manner. 
More important than our rejection of Davis’ interpretation of Heidegger’s 
concept of the will is the fact that as early as 1930, so prior to his Rectoral 
Address, he developed his own concept of the will and that this proper concept of 
willing was phenomenologically motivated. In his confrontation with Kant’s 
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concept of the pure will, he realized that the law of willing is not something 
present-at-hand within us, but accessible only via a knowledge that arises 
from such willing: “the fact of the ought announces itself in the actual willing” 
(GA 31: 290; emphasis added). According to Heidegger this factuality of the 
ought can never be encountered as long as we consider and analyse the law of 
fi nite pure willing and ourselves as present-at-hand objects6.
 2. Heidegger’s confrontation with the will in his Auseinandersetzung with 
Nietzsche (1936–1937)
Before we trace Heidegger’s concept of the will in his Rectoral Address (see 
§3), we focus on Heidegger’s confrontation with Nietzsche’s concept of the will 
in the mid-thirties. By focussing on Heidegger’s confrontation with the will in 
his lecture course of 1936/37, it will become clear that Heidegger’s destruction 
of the will in the early thirties is continued and developed further in the mid-thir-
ties.7 On the basis of this elaboration, we are able to understand what Hei-
degger had in mind when he developed his concept of willing in the thirties. 
According to Nietzsche, will doesn’t indicate a psychological phenome-
non, but rather the Being of beings: “Only where there is life is there also will; 
not will to life but—thus I teach you—will to power”.8 In his lecture course 
Heidegger stresses the ontological status of Nietzsche’s concept of the will: if, 
according to Nietzsche, will to power is the basic character of all beings, then 
6 In a lecture course from 1914, Heidegger’s tutor, Edmund Husserl, developed also a 
phenomenology of the will. But his phenomenology of the will does not show this fact of the 
ought in actual willing. For Husserl, the will is a type of act embedded in consciousness. To 
distinguish between the act of willing and the desiring acts (joy, wish), he shows that both are 
acts of reaching for…, but in case of willing, something is missing: “Das Wünschen vermeint 
ein “<Es> möge sein”, das Wollen ein “Es soll sein”, wobei das “Es soll” freilich in bestimmten 
Sinn zu nehmen ist. Der Wille, sagt man, geht auf Verwirklichung” (Hua 28: 105). For Husserl, it 
is not the actual willing that is characterized by the fact of the ought, but rather the willed object. 
According to Heidegger’s argument, the reason why Husserl didn’t see the fact of the ought in 
actual willing is that, for him, the will is located in a present at hand object (consciousness), 
which is reaching for… a willed object (cf. GA 60: 57–63). A more detailed comparison of 
Heidegger’s and Husserl’s phenomenologies of the will is, however, beyond the scope of this 
article.
7 Th is goes against Davis’s view; he claimed that, in this period, Heidegger fi rst destructed the 
traditional concept of willing and tried to work out a proper sense of the will (Davis 2007: 73).
8 KSA 4: 149. Nietzsche’s characterization of Being as will is rooted in the German philo-
sophical tradition. Not only Schopenhauer, whose main work was of major importance for the 
thinking of Nietzsche, understood Being as will, but also Schelling, who says in his Abhandlung 
über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit : “Es gibt in der letzten Instanz und gar kein anderes 
Sein als Wollen. Wollen ist Ursein” (Schelling 1856: 350). In the end, this characterization of 
Being as will goes back to Leibniz, who saw it as the original unity of perceptio and appetitus, as 
the unity of representation and willing.
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its defi nition cannot appeal to a particular being or a specifi c circumstance in 
the world (GA 43: 44). Heidegger illustrates this with an example. 
Normally, the will is taken to be a faculty of the soul.9 Th e soul is a particu-
lar being, distinct from body and mind. However, if the will provides the es-
sence of every being, then it does not pertain to the soul. Rather, the soul, the 
body and the mind pertain to the will, inasmuch as such things are. If every 
being is willing, then it cannot be derived from the soul. Neither can the will 
be understood as an ability or power of the soul, in contrast to, for example, 
the ability to perceive. According to Heidegger, each ability is already a power 
to do something, and as such already a will to power. Th e will can not be 
therefore further characterized by defi ning it as a faculty of the soul, because 
the essence of every faculty is already grounded in the essence of the will to 
power: “If will to power characterizes Being itself, there is nothing else that 
will can be defi ned as. Will is will”.10 
Because the will cannot be identifi ed with a being that is willing some-
thing, or with something that can be willed, Heidegger’s confrontation with 
the will starts with the phenomenon of willing. Willing is a kind of behaviour 
directed towards something, a going after. Now it seems to be obvious that the 
essence of willing as directedness towards something would be grasped most 
purely by distinguishing it from other modes of directedness towards some-
thing, like representing or wishing, for instance.11 However, this approach 
is inappropriate according to Heidegger: “No, willing is not wishing at all. 
It is the submission of ourselves to our own command, and our exposure 
(Entschlossenheit) to such self-command, which already implies our carrying 
out the command“ (GA 43: 47). 
  9 Th is characteristic of the will goes back to Aristotle. He defi nes will (boulèsis) as a striving 
(orexis) which is connected to a rational representation and is located in the rational part of the 
soul (OS: 432b5–7). According to Heidegger, this defi nition of the will is decisive for the rest 
of the philosophical tradition. For Nietzsche’s own destruction of the will as a characteristic of 
the soul, see KSA 5: 31–34. For a comprehensive study of the will in the Western philosophical 
tradition, see Pink & Stone 2004. 
10 GA 43: 45. Although Heidegger is not explicitly referring to the issue, his discussion 
of Nietzsche’s concept of the will implies much more than appears at fi rst sight. According 
to Heidegger, it is typical for the metaphysical tradition from Plato on to assign priority to 
beings in the determination of the Being of beings. Also Nietzsche uses concepts which seem 
to be derived from a psychological state, when he characterizes the will as an aff ect or passion. 
However, Heidegger makes clear that Nietzsche doesn’t derive Being from beings. Th is means 
that Nietzsche, according to Heidegger, already said farewell to the metaphysical way of asking 
about Being (without implying that Nietzsche found the appropriate way of asking about 
Being) (cf. GA 43: 46): “Nietzsche hat zwar diese Sachlage nie grundsätzlich und systematisch 
entfaltet, aber er weiß doch klar, daß er hier steht” (GA 43: 44; cf. 59). 
11 Th is is for instance the approach of Husserl in his lecture course on the will from 1914. 
Th e starting point for his phenomenology of the will is the distinction between wishing and 
willing directedness (cf. Hua 28: 105).
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Heidegger recognizes that this account of willing seems to be unphenom-
enological at fi rst sight, that it cannot be derived from the willing directedness 
towards something. But, according to Heidegger, it is rather the isolation of 
willing (relation) of the one who wills, and that which is willed (relata), and 
the comparison of this “pure” relation with other relations—the represent-
ing or wishing relation for instance—which is unphenomenological. Willing 
doesn’t exist without the one who wills and that which is willed; that which is 
willed and the one who wills are brought into the willing, “although not in the 
extrinsic sense in which we can say that to every striving belongs something 
that strives and something that is striven for” (GA 43: 48). In this charac-
terisation of the will in his lecture course of 1936/37, we recognize the same 
interconnectedness and interdependency of the one who wills and that which 
is willed in willing that we encountered already in the 1930 course. Th e ques-
tion is this: how does the one who wills and that which is willed belong to-
gether in willing according to Heidegger? How are the one who wills and that 
which is willed related? Heidegger explains this interdependency by discussing 
Nietzsche’s characterisation of the will as aff ect and feeling. 
When Nietzsche defi nes will in relation to concepts such as aff ects and 
feelings, there’s a temptation to connect the psychological quality of these 
terms with man as the subject of the will. Yet Heidegger keeps open the pos-
sibility that the will is not primarily the will of the subject: “Will as mastery 
of oneself (Über-sich-Herrsein) is never the encapsulation of the ego from its 
surroundings”.12 Just as Heidegger tries to conceive the will out of the willing 
relation, and not out of the relata (the one who wills or that which is willed), 
he also understands aff ects and feelings primarily as relational phenomena: We 
must above all see that here it is not a matter for psychology .... It is a matter 
of the basic modes that constitute Dasein, a matter of the ways man confronts 
the Da, the openness and concealment of beings, in which he stands (GA 
43: 52). An aff ect is primarily a mode of being (Seinsweise), in which the one 
who wills and that which is willed are interconnected. We follow Heidegger’s 
lecture course for a moment to develop an answer to our question, how the 
one who wills and that which is willed belong together in the willing relation.
An aff ect, anger for instance, comes over us, seizes us, aff ects us. Our being 
is moved by a kind of excitement, something stirs us up and lifts us beyond 
ourselves. Heidegger conceives the fi rst essential moment in the aff ect by ap-
pealing to popular speech: 
12 GA 43: 56. According to Heidegger, it is not necessary to explain the will as subjective 
will, because Nietzsche himself says that the will is something very complicated, something that 
is a unity only as a word. According to Heidegger, Nietzsche doesn’t provide a clear answer to 
the question what an aff ect is. He only assumes that it is a confi guration of the will to power. In 
fact, this fi nding is incorrect, because Nietzsche explains the will to power out of his refl ections 
on the essence of the aff ective (cf. KSA 5: 54–55). 
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Popular speech proves to be keen-sighted when it says of someone who is 
stirred up and acts in an excited manner, “He isn’t altogether himself ”. When 
we are seized by excitement, our being “altogether there” vanishes; it is trans-
formed into a kind of “falling apart” (auseinander) (GA 43: 53). 
According to Heidegger, Nietzsche has in mind this fi rst essential moment 
in the aff ect, when he calls the will an aff ect. Willing is being lifted beyond 
oneself (über-sich-hinaus-wollen/sein), insofar as the one who wills and that 
which is willed “fall apart” in willing, and as such is characterized by an über-
sich-hinaus-wollen/sein. Th e one who is willing is lifted beyond oneself, namely 
towards that which is willed (GA 42: 217).
According to Heidegger, Nietzsche has also the other essential moment in 
the aff ect in mind when he calls the will an aff ect, the moment of seizure in 
the aff ect by which something comes over us. When the will assaults or comes 
over us, this doesn’t mean we fi rst exist, and then will something. We are always 
in the scope of willing, even when we are unwilling. “Th at genuine willing 
which surges forward in our exposure (Entschlossenheit) to it, that ‘yes’, is what 
instigates the seizure of our entire being, of the very essence within us” (GA 
43: 54–55). Heidegger conceives the being-beyond-oneself, which characterizes 
the will (fi rst essential moment in the aff ect), as ex-posure (Entschlossenheit).13 
Ent-schlossenheit means the will already said farewell to “the encapsulation of 
the ego from its surroundings” (subjectivity) and exposes itself to “the Da, the 
openness and concealment of beings, in which he stands” (Dasein). “Willing 
is the ex-posure toward oneself, but as the one who wills what is posited in the 
willing as willed” (GA 43: 48). 
It is striking that, according to Heidegger, it is not the one who wills or 
that which is willed which is entschlossen (relata), but willing itself (relation). 
Willing ex-poses itself towards the one who wills, as the one who is willed in 
willing. And here we fi nd the answer to our question about how the intercon-
nectedness of the one who wills and that which is willed has to be understood. 
Th e one who wills and that which is willed are interconnected in the expo-
sure (Entschlossenheit) of willing. Heidegger states that this interconnectedness 
has the character of law-giving; “Willing is the ex-posure to self-command” 
(GA 43: 47). Although Heidegger doesn’t explain here why willing should 
13 With the concept of Entschlossenheit, Heidegger brings one of his own basic concepts 
of Being and Time in connection with Nietzsche’s concept of the will. Normally, this word 
means resoluteness and indicates the resoluteness of the will of the subject. Literally, neverthe-
less, Entschlossenheit means Ent-schlossenheit, “unclosedness,” i.e., not exactly will as the reso-
luteness of the subject, but exposure to the openness and concealment of beings, in which the 
one who wills and what is willed are interconnected. “Das Wesen des Wollens wird hier in 
die Ent-schlossenheit zurückgenommen. Aber das Wesen der Ent-schlossenheit liegt in der 
Ent-borgenheit des menschlichen Daseins für die Lichtung des Seins und keineswegs in einer 
Kraftspeicherung des Agierens. Cf. Sein und Zeit §44 und §60. Der Bezug zum Sein aber ist 
das Lassen.” (GA 40: 23)
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be understood as self-command, our discussion of the lawgiving character 
of willing in §1 can be helpful. Th ere we saw that fi nite pure willing has the 
character of lawgiving, which solely is in willing it. We saw there that the law 
of fi nite pure willing is actual in a twofold sense. Th e law of fi nite pure willing 
is in fact only because and insofar as the will wills it, and the will is only in the 
ought demanded by pure willing, i.e. the law of fi nite pure willing.
In his lecture course of 1936/37, this lawgiving character of willing is un-
derstood as the self-command of willing. Th is exposure to self-command is, 
on the one hand, the exposure to the command of the one who wills to be that 
which is willed; on the other hand it is the exposure to that which is willed, 
as that on which the self-command of the one who wills is focused. Willing 
wills the one who wills as that which is willed. It is in this sense that Heidegger 
speaks about the self-command of the one who wills in willing, namely the 
self-command to the one who wills, to be that which is willed.14 In this char-
acteristic of the will as self-command, we recognize the lawgiving character of 
willing that we encountered already in the 1930 course.
Heidegger distinguishes two aspects of this self-command of willing to be 
that which is willed in his confrontation with Nietzsche. Th e one who wills 
can only will to be the willed when both are not identical. If the one who 
wills were identical to that which is willed, then there would be no necessity 
for him to be the willed in willing. Ent-schlossen is willing when that which 
is willed is beyond the one who is willing and, as such, awakens the willing 
directedness towards the willed15; in willing, the one who wills determines 
that which is willed (Sichbefehlen). At the same time, the one who wills is 
not an isolated being who decides to will that which is willed. “Only he can 
truly command […] who is always ready and able to place himself under 
command. By means of such readiness he has placed himself within the scope 
of the command as fi rst to obey, the paragon of obedience” (GA 43: 49). It 
is not our decision to will the willed, according to Heidegger. Will itself has 
a moment of seizure, that comes over us: “Th at we can be beyond or outside 
ourselves in this or that way, and that we are in fact constantly so, is possible 
only because will itself—seen in relation to the essence of man—is seizure 
pure and simple” (GA 43: 54). In the self-command of willing, that which is 
willed determines the one who wills (Sichbefehlen).
Here, we not only get an answer to our question how the character of 
law-giving of Heidegger’s concept of the will needs to be understood; we also 
encounter the self-orientation of willing in Heidegger’s concept of the self-
command. To understand the self-orientation of willing, we return to our 
earlier characterization of willing as “willing out beyond ourselves”. Th ere we 
14 As early as 1930 Heidegger sees this character of the will: “Everyone who actually wills 
knows: to actually will is to will nothing else but the ought of one’s existence” (GA 31: 289).
15 “Im Willen als Mehr-sein-wollen, im Willen als Wille zur Macht liegt wesentlich die 
Steigerung, die Erhöhung” (GA 43: 70).
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saw that the destructed concept of the will is not just ecstatic or lifted beyond 
itself. Heidegger is quite specifi c here and understands “being lifted beyond 
ourselves” as a way of “losing ourselves”. So in one way or another, willing is 
connected with the question about ourselves16; the “falling apart” of the one 
who wills and that which is willed in willing, is the falling apart or cleavage 
between “self ” and (authentic or original) “self ”. And this cleavage or dif-
ference is the impetus for the directedness of willing to bring the self to the 
(original) self: “But such reaching out in passion does not simply lift us up 
and away beyond ourselves. It gathers our essential being to its proper ground” 
(GA 43: 56). Heidegger’s primary concern is self-assertion (Selbstbehauptung): 
“Power is will as willing out beyond itself, precisely in that way to come to 
itself, to fi nd and assert itself in the circumscribed simplicity of its essence, in 
Greek, entelecheia” (GA 43: 74, my emphasis). Heidegger’s destructed concept 
of willing is characterized by a circular movement, in which the one who wills 
(self ) and that which is willed (original self ) are interconnected. “Willing al-
ways brings the self to itself; it thereby fi nds itself out beyond itself. It maintains 
itself within the thrust away from one thing toward something else” (GA 43: 61, 
my emphasis).
Th e self-orientation of willing consists in the interest to bridge the gap be-
tween self and (original) self, and must be understood as the “gathering of our 
essential being to its proper ground” or as “a going back into its essence, into 
the origin” (GA 43: 70, my emphasis). Moreover, it becomes clear that willing 
is primarily concerned with the unity of self and original self. Again, however, 
it becomes clear that the self-orientation of willing cannot be interpreted as 
existential voluntarism, exactly because of the interconnectedness of the one 
who wills and that which is willed in willing, on the one hand, and the law-
giving character of willing, on the other.
 3. Conclusions: Heidegger’s confrontation with the will
in his Rectoral Address (1933)
From the analysis in sections one and two, we have to conclude that, as 
early as 1930, so prior to his Rectoral Address, Heidegger developed his own 
destructed concept of the will: the self-orientation of willing consists in the 
fact that the cause of willing is actual willing itself. In actual willing, the one 
who wills and that which is willed are interdependent and interconnected. 
Th is interdependency has the character of law-giving. Heidegger’s destructed 
concept of willing is further developed in the mid-thirties: the one who wills 
16 Cf. “Das Wesen der Person ist die Selbstverantwortlichkeit: sich an sich selbst, nicht 
egoistisch und in bezug auf das zufällige Ich, binden. Selbstverantwortlichsein, nur antworten 
und d.h. zuerst immer nur fragen nach dem Wesen des Selbst. Diesem zuerst und in allem das 
Wort geben, das Sollen des reinen Wollens wollen“ (GA 31: 293). 
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and that which is willed are interconnected in the exposure of willing. Th is 
exposure is, on the one hand, the exposure to the self-command of the one 
who wills to be that which is willed, and, on the other hand, the exposure 
to that which is willed, as that on which the self-command of the one who is 
willing is focused. We have seen that in willing, the one who wills determines 
that which is willed (sichbefehlen) and at the same time, that which is willed 
is determining the one who wills (sichbefehlen). It is in this sense that the will 
concerns the unity of self and original self and is therefore characterized by 
self-orientation. 
Th e elaboration of Heidegger’s concept of the will enables us to answer the 
question whether his concept of the will is new when we compare it with other 
conceptions of the will in the philosophical tradition. First of all, we recognize 
Heidegger’s general critique of the metaphysical tradition in his conception 
of the interconnectedness of the will. According to Heidegger, the question 
of Being in the metaphysical tradition does not ask thematically about Being. 
What is asked about is beings as such; the point for departure in the meta-
physical tradition is beings, and what is asked for is the Being of these beings 
(cf. GA 40: 14). In the same way, beings are also the point for departure 
concerning the will in the metaphysical tradition (the one who wills or that 
which is willed). Unlike the metaphysical tradition, Heidegger is asking for 
the will as such, i.e. willing. And because of this radically diff erent orientation 
in his question of Being, Heidegger encounters the interconnectedness of will-
ing, the one who wills and that which is willed. Also the second characteristic 
of willing—its law-giving character—is quite new when we compare it with 
the metaphysical tradition. Of course, also Kant and Nietzsche pointed to 
the law-giving or commanding character of the will (cf. §1), but the interde-
pendency of Sichbefehlen and Sichbefehlen in willing signifi es that the human 
being is neither the subject nor the object of the will. According to Heidegger, 
the factuality of the ought can never be encountered as long as our point of 
departure is a being, i.e. a subject who wills or an object that is willed.
Only the self-orientation of willing is quite traditional. In modern philo-
sophical tradition—from Kant to Nietzsche—the freedom, self-determina-
tion and selfhood of willing is in the centre of philosophical attention. Ac-
cording to Fichte, to give only one example, the will is “the authentic basic 
root of human being”. When we will something, we simultaneously will our-
selves as a free being: “I fi nd myself, as myself, only in willing”, i.e. only in 
willing do we have an experience of ourselves according to Fichte.17 Th is ex-
ample illustrates the self-evident connection between will and self in modern 
philosophical tradition. On the one hand, the self-orientation of Heidegger’s 
17 Quoted in Ritter et al. 1971–2005: 784.
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concept of the will seems to be rooted in this tradition.18 On the other hand, 
the other two characteristics of Heidegger’s concept of the will make clear 
that his destructed concept of willing cannot be understood in an existential-
voluntaristic or subjective way. 
Th e fi nal test of our hypothesis, that Heidegger’s embrace of the will in 
the beginning of the thirties doesn’t testify to a massive or existential volun-
tarism, but is rather due to his confrontation with the will, can be found in 
Heidegger’s Rectoral Address from 1933. 
In the opening paragraph of Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität, 
Heidegger starts with the „spiritual mission“ of the university, which must 
be willed (GA 16: 108). Th is will arise from “the resoluteness (Entschlossen-
heit) of the German students to stand fi rm in the face of the extreme distress 
of German fate” (GA 16: 112). Heidegger calls for a true will: “Th is will is 
a true will, provided that the German students, through the new Student 
Law, place themselves under the law of their essence and thereby delimit 
this essence for the fi rst time. To give law to oneself is the highest freedom” 
(GA 16: 112–113). He ends this lecture with the remark that “it is our will 
that our people (Volk) fulfi l its historical mission”: “We will ourselves!” 
(GA 16: 117). We encounter the same vocabulary as in the lecture courses of 
1930 and 1936/37; Wille, Entschlossenheit, Selbstbefehl, Selbst das Gesetz geben 
etc. Is there any reason to understand the Rectoral Address as existential volun-
tarism and as the unbounded employment of the will in Heidegger´s political 
speeches of 1933–34, as Davis suggests (Davis 2007: 72)? 
As I elaborated elsewhere, Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität 
is inquiring into the identity of human being (Dasein) in connection with the 
question about das Eigene (the Germans) and das Fremde (the Greeks) (Blok 
2010: 273–292). Th is opposition structures the confrontation with the begin-
ning of philosophical thinking in the Rectoral Address. Because a fulll discus-
sion of Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität is beyond the scope of 
this article, we have to restrict ourselves here to discussing Heidegger’s concept 
of the will in the Rectoral Address. 
18 Jacob Rogozinski admits the diff erence between the modern philosophical interest in the 
human subject and Heidegger’s interest in Dasein, but nevertheless points to the “existential 
solipsism” in his understanding of Dasein: “A voice from Outside, which is nevertheless not the 
voice of Another, of ‘a foreign power which would penetrate Dasein’, which is the call of No 
Other, that is, of Self: ‘in Gewissen, Dasein calls itself ’. It calls itself away from its inauthentic 
and fallen Self to its possible authenticity—it calls on itself to come back to itself from its 
alienation, its foreignness. Everything happens as if, having detected the original phenomenon 
of the call in its pure, indeterminate form, Heidegger rushed to submit it to a certain deter-
mination, to impose on it the structure of a recall to oneself, to either reappropriate it for or 
repatriate it to the Self. And this is because he understands the phenomenon of the call from 
within the horizon of being-toward-death, the ‘existential solipsism’ where Dasein, isolating 
itself in its ‘ownness’, projects itself toward its own-most possibility” (Rogozinski 2002: 52–53).
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Heidegger argues that the will of das Eigene (the Germans) requires that 
“we again place ourselves under the power of the beginning of our spiritual-
historical existence (Dasein)” (GA 16: 108). For Heidegger, this beginning 
is the fi rst beginning of Greek philosophy. If Heidegger relates the will to 
this beginning of philosophy, then this concept has to be destructed in his 
Rectoral Address. Why? Normally, willing is directed to something in the 
future that becomes present through the act of willing. Th e past is closed 
off  for willing19; we cannot will the beginning or Anfang. When Heidegger 
therefore argues that the willing of das Eigene requires that we place ourselves 
under the power of the Anfang, he is willing something which is impossible 
in ordinary (voluntaristic) willing. Th is impossibility shows already that also 
in his Rectoral Address the concept of willing is destructed and is used only in 
this destructed manner.
But there is also another reason why the will is already destructed in Hei-
degger’s Rectoral Address. Traditionally, the will is without a beginning because 
the will is only willing itself (power). Because of this self-interest of willing, 
the will is always already away from the beginning and, therefore, away from 
any possible limitation of willing by this beginning. When Heidegger there-
fore says that the will of das Eigene requires from us that we place ourselves 
under the power of the beginning, then the self-orientation of willing has to 
be destructed and is only used in this destructed non-voluntaristic way. Only 
such a destructed concept of willing is able to place us under the power of the 
beginning, submit ourselves (Fügen) to the distant command (ferne Verfügung) 
of the fi rst beginning (GA 16: 110–111). 
Later on—around 1938—Heidegger realized that the concept of the will 
is anchored irrevocably in human being as the subject of willing. In his lec-
ture Nietzsches Wort “Gott ist Tot” from 1943, based on the Nietzsche lectures 
delivered between 1936 and 1940, he writes the following about the essential 
character of the will: 
To will is to will-to-be-master. […] Will strives for what it wills not just as for 
something that it does not yet have. What the will wills it has already. For will 
wills its willing. Will wills itself. It exceeds itself. In this way will as will wills 
above and beyond itself, and therefore at the same time it must bring itself 
beneath and behind itself (GA 5: 234). 
Heidegger realizes now that the circular movement of willing is dominated 
by the third characteristic of willing, i.e. the self-orientation or self-interest 
of willing; the will always wills out beyond itself (ecstatic) and brings the 
19 Cf. Husserl’s concept of willing: “Der Wille, sagt man dann, kann nicht auf Ideales ge-
hen, sondern nur auf Reales, und nicht auf Vergangenes, sondern auf Künftiges; im Gegensatz 
zur Freude und zum Wunsch. Jemand kann sich freuen, dass sich ein ideales mathematisches 
Verhälnis, dass sich die geltung eines Satzes und Beweises herausstellt bzw. es wünschen” (Hua 
28: 106). 
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other-than-itself back into the domain of this self (incorporation). “Since will 
is the overpowering of itself, no richness of life will satisfy it. It has its power 
in overreaching [im Überreichen]—namely, in reaching over its own will. Th us 
it, as the same, is constantly coming back unto itself as the same” (GA 5: 237). 
He now understands that the concept of the will is anchored in a “menschli-
cher Vorgriff ”, i.e. in the human being as a subject that is willing something20: 
“With the subjectivity of the subject, will comes to light as the essence of that 
subjectivity” (GA 5: 243). At that time, he realized that the self-orientation of 
willing can be seen as the essence of subjectivity, and dropped the concept of 
the will completely.21 
One of the main issues in his later thought is the releasement from the 
wilful way of thinking and the exploration of the possibility of a gelassen or 
non-willing way of philosophical thinking (GA 77: 309). For Heidegger, it 
is clear that our generation is not yet able to think non-willingly. At best we 
are on the way to Gelassenheit. On this way, the incessant problematization of 
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